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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
SHIRLEY CARRIER,
Plaintiff/ Appellant,
Case No. 940550-CA

vs.
PRO-TECH RESTORATION dba
STONE CARPETS, WILLIAM
ROGER SMITH, AND PLEASANT
GROVE CITY,

Priority No. 2
Defendants/Appellees.
JURISDICTION OF THE COURT
The Utah Supreme Court had original jurisdiction of this
matter

in

accordance

with

Article

VIII,

Section

5 of

the

Constitution of Utah and Utah Code Annotated 78-2-2(3) (j ) (1994
as Amended).

The matter was properly poured over to the Utah

Court of Appeals in accordance with Utah Code Annotated 78-2a3(2)(k) (1994 as Amended).
DETERMINATIVE RULES AND STATUTES
Rule 47 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure provides as
follows:
. . . (b) Alternate jurors.

The court may direct

that one or two jurors in addition to the regular panel
be called and impanelled to sit as alternate jurors.
Alternate jurors in the order in which they are called
shall replace jurors, who prior to the time the jury
retires

to

consider

its verdict, become

disqualify to perform their duties.

unable

or

Alternate juror

shall be drawn in the same manner, shall have the same
qualifications,

shall

be

subject

to

the

same

examination and challenges, shall take the same oath,
and shall have the same functions, powers, facilities,
and privileges as the principal jurors.

An alternate

juror who does not replace a principal juror shall be
discharged
verdict.

after

the

jury

retires

to

consider

its

If one or two alternate jurors are called

each party is entitled to one peremptory challenge in
addition to those otherwise allowed.
peremptory

challenge

may

be

used

The additional
only

against

alternate juror, and the other peremptory
allowed

by

law

shall

not

be

used

an

challenges

against

the

alternates.
(c) Challenge defined; by whom made.

A challenge

is an objection made to the trial jurors and may be
directed
juror.

(1) to the panel
Either party may

or

(2) to

challenge

an

individual

the jurors, but

where there are several parties on either side, they
must join in a challenge before it can be made.
(d)

challenge

taking; proceedings.

to

panel;

time

and

manner

of

A challenge to the panel can be

founded only on a material

departure

from the

forms

prescribed in respect to the drawing and return of the
jury, or on the

intentional

omission of the proper

officer to summon one or more of the jurors drawn.

2

It

must be taken before a juror is sworn.
writing

or

be

voted

by

the

It must be in

reporter,

and

must

specifically st forth the facts constitution the ground
of challenge.

If the challenge is allowed, the court

must discharge the jury so far as the trial in question
is concerned.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A.

Nature of the Case.

The Plaintiff commenced this action to recover damages for
personal injuries that she allegedly sustained in a motor vehicle
accident that occurred on January 15, 1991 in Utah County, State
of Utah

(R.

1-5).

In her Amended Complaint, the

Plaintiff

alleged that the Defendant William Roger Smith was negligent in
the

operation

proximately

of

his

caused

motor

the

Complaint, R. 42-45).

vehicle

accident

in

with

The Plaintiff

that

the

his

negligence

Plaintiff

contended

(Amended

in her

Second

Cause of Action against the Defendant Pleasant Grove City that
the City was negligent in failing to determine that the stop sign
at the intersection where the motor vehicle accident occurred was
missing.

The

proximately

Plaintiff

caused

the

claimed
accident

that
and

the
her

City's
injuries

negligent
(Amended

Complaint, R. 38-42).
B.

Procedural History of the Case.

1.
(R. 1-5).

The Plaintiff filed her Complaint on October 17, 1991
An Amended Complaint was filed on March 10, 1992 (R.

38-45).
3

2.
1992,

The City of Pleasant Grove filed its Answer on March 25,
denying

that

it

was

negligent

and

claiming,

as

an

affirmative defense that the Plaintiff's damages and injuries, if
any, were

caused

by

the

Plaintiff's

own

negligence

or

the

negligence of other third parties over whom the Defendant had no
control (R. 49-52).
3.

The Defendant William Roger Smith and his employer Pro-

Tech Restoration d/b/a Stone Carpets filed their Answer on April
27, 1992 denying that William Roger Smith was negligent and that
the Plaintiff's damages and injuries, if any, were caused by the
Plaintiff's own negligence or the negligence of third

parties

over whom the Defendants had no control (R. 55-59).
4.

On August 18, 1992, Robert L. Moody, Esq. entered his

appearance as attorney for the Defendant William Roger Smith (R.
107-108).
Tech

Prior to Mr. Moody's appearance, the Defendant's Pro-

Restoration

and Mr.

Smith

had

been

represented

by

one

lawyer, M. Dale Jeffs (R. 55-59).
5.

On June 23, 1993, the Plaintiff filed a motion to limit

the number of the Defendants' peremptory challenges (R. 374-381).
6.

Pleasant Grove City filed a memorandum in opposition to

the Plaintiff's motion to limit the number of the Defendant's
peremptory challenges on July 9, 1993.

The Defendant Pleasant

Grove City maintained that the Defendants in this action were
truly antagonistic in that the Plaintiff's allegations against
each

Defendant

are

different

and

required

separate

Answers.

Additionally, the duties of the Defendants to Plaintiff, if any,
4

are of a different nature and require independent counsel

(R.

479-483).
7.

The Defendant, on August 12, 1993,

William Roger Smith

also filed a memorandum in opposition to the Plaintiff's motion
to limit the number of the Defendants' peremptory challenges (R.
487-489).
8.

On July

12, 1993 the Defendant Pro-Tech

Restoration

d/b/a/ Stone Carpets, filed its memorandum in opposition to the
Plaintiff's motion to

limit the number peremptory

available to the Defendants.

challenges

Pro-Tech Restoration claimed that

as in Sutton v. Otis Elevator Co., 249 P.2d 437 (Utah 1926), the
parties in this action had interests that were adverse to each
other (R. 515-518).
9.

As evidence of the conflict between the parties, M. Dale

Jeffs, Esq. filed a motion of July 13, 1993, on behalf of ProTech Restoration seeking to obtain a court ruling excluding the
Defendant William Roger Smith's prior inconsistent statements.
In support

of

the motion, the Defendant Pro-Tech

Restoration

alleged as follows:
1.

Plaintiff's

claim

against

Defendant

Stone

Carpets arises from the fact that it owned the van that
was

driven

by

William

Roger

Smith

on

the

day

Plaintiff's vehicle collided into the side of the ProTech

Restoration

Additionally,
Carpets

and

Roger

van

in

Pleasant

Smith was

working

for
5

them

Grove

an employee
at

the

time

City.

of
of

Stone
the

accident.
2.

Roger Smith gave an informal statement to the

police officer at the scene shortly after the accident
in which he indicated he made a "California" stop and
slowly rolled through the intersection, after checking
both ways.
3.

In

subsequent

statements

given

to

investigators for both parties and the informal answer
filed herein and a copy given to Plaintiff's attorney,
Roger Smith indicated that the van he was driving
stalled part way through the intersection and that it
was while trying to re-start the vehicle that he was
struck by Ms. Carrier.
4.

In the deposition of September 10, 1992, Roger

Smith told Ms. Carrier's attorney the van did not stall
in the intersection.

He alleged that the Stones told

him to say the van stalled and indicate to anyone
questioning him that the van had stalled.

He alleges

that the Stones told him "this lady is going to sue us
for a lot of money and we got to get out of it, " or
words to that affect.
Smith, page 67).

(Deposition of William Roger

He claimed it was implicit in their

direction that their request was connected to his
continued employment.
Smith, page 90).
R. 523-529.
6

(Deposition of William Roger

10.
and

The conflict between the Defendant William Roger Smith

Pro-Tech

Restoration

his

employer,

conflict between all of the Defendants.
Plaintiff

filed

a

Defendant's motion

trial
in

memorandum

limiting

insurance involvement.

caused

significant

On July 15, 1993, the
in

opposition

to

the

to prohibit the mentioning

of

In support of the Plaintiff's position

that the issue of insurance could be raised with the jury, the
Plaintiff stated as follows:
.

However, Defendant's memorandum

does not

address the reason why Plaintiff intends to tell the
jury

about

insurance

Plaintiff's
accident

version

are

in

in this
of

sharp

multiple versions.

the

case.
facts

contrast

In this
surrounding

to the

case
the

Defendant's

In this case the Defendant driver

of the Stone's Carpet van has given several versions of
what happened.

At his deposition he admitted that he

lied about the accident to protect his employer who was
having trouble keeping liability insurance.
of

the

vehicle

employer
interest.

testified

told him

to

at

deposition

lie to protect the

The driver
that

his

employer's

For the Plaintiff to adequately address the

issue of bias and prejudice it is necessary to get into
the fact that the inconsistent

stories were told to

protect against the loss of insurance coverage.
R. 542-545.
11.

The case was tried to a jury on July 15 through July

7

22, 1993, August 2nd and 3rd, 1993 and on August 16, 17 and 24,
1993 (R. 818-825).

The jury rendered its decision by answering

the questions contained on the Special Verdict.
the

Defendant

William

Roger

Smith

The jury found

4 0 % negligent

Plaintiff, Shirley Carrier, 60% negligent.

and

the

The jury found that

the Defendant Pleasant Grove City was not negligent (R. 815-817).
12.

Judgment on the jury verdict was entered on August 24,

1993 (R. 828-830).
13.

The

Plaintiff

filed

a

motion

for

judgment

notwithstanding the verdict on September 2, 1993 (R. 860-861).
After consideration of the extensive memoranda (R. 862-886, 921927,

929-955,

976-995),

Judge

Ray

M.

Harding

denied

the

Plaintiff's motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict, or
in the alternative, for a new trial (R. 1006-1008).
14.

Plaintiff filed a motion for relief from order pursuant

to Rule 60(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure on November
12, 1993.

The Plaintiff cited, as a basis for the motion, the

Utah Supreme Court's ruling in Randle v. Allen, 862 P.2d

1329

(Utah 1993) (R. 1010-1024).
15.

The Defendant Pleasant Grove City filed a response to

the Plaintiff's motion pursuant to Rule 60(b) on November 22,
1993 (R. 1028-1036).
its memorandum

The Defendant Pro-Tech Restoration filed

in opposition on

November 23, 1993

(R. 1038-

1046).
16.

On November

23, 1993

finding:
8

the

court

entered

its

Order

The Court noted that at the time of the
hearing in chambers on the motion to limit
peremptory challenges, the Court made findings at
that time that there was sufficient adversity between
the various Defendants, that each Defendant was
entitled to separate peremptory challenges.
Accordingly, the Court now, denies the Motion for
Relief from Order Denying Plaintiff's Motion for
a New Trial.
R. 1047-1048.
17.

The Plaintiff filed her notice of appeal on November

23, 1993 (R. 1036.1-1036.3).
18.

The Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Disposition filed

with the Utah Supreme Court was denied on January 10, 1994.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
1.

The accident at issue in this case occurred on Tuesday,

January 15, 1991 at the intersection of 1100 North and 500 East
in Pleasant Grove, Utah.

The investigating officer noted that

the accident occurred during the daytime in cloudy conditions and
that it was snowing and the roads were slick at the time of his
investigation (T., Vol. II at 1409-1415, 1443-1445).
2.

The Defendant William Roger Smith told the investigating

officer at the scene that he was Southbound on 500 East, did not
see a stop sign

and proceeded into the intersection.

Mr. Smith

explained that the Plaintiff, Ms. Carrier was proceeding up the
hill, Eastbound on 1100 North and they collided (T., Vol. II at

9

1428).
3.

At trial, the Defendant, William Roger Smith testified

that he was 26 years of age and had a high school education (T.
Vol.

Ill

at

1453-1459).

At

the

time

of

the

accident,

the

Defendant was employed by the Defendant Stone Carpets as a carpet
cleaner

(T., Vol.

Ill

at

1463).

On

January

15, 1991

the

Defendant William Roger Smith was operating a blue van owned by
Stone

Carpets

testified

(T., Vol. Ill

that he was

at

traveling

1468).

The Defendant

at approximately

Smith

15 mph and

slowed down as he entered the intersection where the accident
occurred.

The Defendant observed the Plaintiff's vehicle

for

the first time, to his right at a distance of twenty to fifty
feet

(T., Vol. Ill at 1482, 1489-1490).

The Defendant

observed the Plaintiff "flying up the hill,"

Smith

going approximately

40 mph (T., Vol. Ill at 1578, 1580, 1583, 1586, 1587-1588).

The

Plaintiff's vehicle struck the van the Defendant was operating
towards the back of the van (T., Vol. Ill at 1493).
4.

The

"California"

Defendant
stop

at the

Smith

testified

intersection

by

that
slowing

he

made

down

to

a
a

sufficient speed in order to allow the vehicle to stop if oncoming traffic was observed (T., Vol. Ill at 1500-1501).
5.

The Defendant Smith testified that shortly after the

accident he was instructed by his employers Joe Stone and Jim
Stone,
To say that when —
through the intersection.
10

I slowed down to look
When I proceeded to go

through the intersection the van stalled and it
slowly went through the intersection. * It didn't
start back up.

And Ms. Carrier came up the hill

and wrecked into me.
T., Vol. Ill at 1517-1518.

The Defendant Smith was told by

Stone that he should tell the investigators the information set
out above, "because this lady is going to sue us" and that story
would attribute more fault to the Plaintiff, Ms. Carrier (T.,
Vol. Ill at 1519).

The Defendant Smith explicitly testified that

Joe Stone was asking him to lie (T., Vol. Ill at 1520-1523).
6.

Pursuant to the instruction of Joe Stone, the Defendant

William Roger Smith told the investigator that the van stalled on
January 18, 1991 (T., Vol. Ill at 1522, 1528, 1530, 1532).

The

Defendant Smith gave another inaccurate statement on January 25,
1991,

again detailing how the van he was driving stalled (T.,

Vol. Ill at 1546, 1549-1550).
7.
to

the

The Defendant William Roger Smith filed a Pro se Answer
Plaintiff's

Complaint

in this

action which he

again

detailed that the van had stalled as he entered the intersection
(T., Vol. Ill at 1557-1559).
8.
to

The Defendant Smith did not feel that it was appropriate

fabricate

accordingly,

a version

of

the Defendant

the

facts

that was not

true

and

Smith told Plaintiff's counsel

his

memory of the accident at the time his deposition was taken (T.,
Vol. Ill at 1561-1563).
9.

Arlen Shupe testified that he was an employee of Stone
11

Carpets and was following the Defendant Smith at the time of the
accident which occurred at 5:00 or 5:30 in the afternoon.

Shupe

testified that the roads where the accident occurred had one lane
in each direction (T., Vol. Ill at 1631-1632).
that

the Plaintiff was traveling

at 35 mph

Shupe testified
(T., Vol. Ill at

1639).
10.

The Plaintiff, Shirley Carrier testified that as she

proceeded Eastbound on 1100 North that,
. . . all of a sudden I just seen this car
coming from the side road.
T., Vol. VI at 2041-2042.

The Plaintiff testified that she did

not have time to react or brake

(T., Vol. VI at 2042).

The

Plaintiff conceded that Smith was in the intersection prior to
the time her vehicle entered the intersection

(T., Vol. VI at

2057-2058).
11.

Paul Thomas Blotter testified that he had received a

Masters in Mechanical Engineering and a Ph.D from Michigan State
University

(T., Vol. VII at 2114-2115).

Dr. Blotter testified

after a review of the evidence in the case and an inspection of
the

intersection

and the Dodge van involved

in the accident,

that the van driven by the Defendant Smith was moving 5 to 10 mph
prior to impact (T., Vol. VII at 2170).

Dr. Blotter testified

that the Toyota, driven by the Plaintiff was traveling between 25
and 30 mph prior to impact (T., Vol. VII at 2171, 2301-2302).
Dr. Blotter also testified that had the Plaintiff reacted to the
Defendant, Smith's presence and braked, the accident could have
12

been avoided (T., Vol. IX at 2301-2311).

Blotter also testified

that the Defendant Smith was clearly in the intersection before
the Plaintiff, Carrier (T., Vol. 10 at 2301-2310).
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The trial court properly ruled that the divergent interests
of

the

Defendants

constituted

a

"substantial

controversy"

entitling each Defendant to their separate preemptory challenges.
The court properly instructed the jury with regard to the
issue of right-of-way.

The instruction used by the court was a

proper and sufficient statement regarding the law and presented
the theories advanced by the parties with regard to right-of-way.
Finally, the court did not commit any error in requiring
Newell Knight to take the stand or with regard to the scope of
the questions posed to Mr. Knight on cross-examination.
ARGUMENT
POINT I: THE TRIAL COURT ACTED PROPERLY IN GRANTING
EACH OF THE PARTIES FOUR PEREMPTORY CHALLENGES.
A.

Rule 47 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.

Rule 47(e) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure governs the
award of peremptory challenges allowed to each party during the
selection of a jury.

The Rule states as follows:

(e) Challenges to individual jurors; number of
peremptory challenges.

The Challenges to individual

jurors are either peremptory or for cause.

Each party

shall

challenges,

be

entitled

to

three

peremptory

except as provided under Subdivisions (b) [alternate
jurors] and (c).

(Emphasis added.)

13

Rule

47(b)

allows

each

party

an

additional

peremptory

challenge in the selection of alternate jurors, and Subdivision
(c) states

that

either party

may

challenge

the

jurors

but

requires multiple parties on the same side of the lawsuit to
join in a challenge before it can be made.
The clear meaning of Rule 47 is that multiple parties on
either side of a lawsuit "must join in the challenge before it
can be made."
B.

Utah Case Law Interpreting Rule 47 URCP.

The Utah Supreme Court, in addressing similar language prior
to the adoption of the Rules of Civil Procedure, held that coparties are not deemed to be on the "same side" of a lawsuit if
there interest are "truly adverse."
141,

249

P.

437, 457-458

defendants acknowledged
and

defendant.

litigated

in

In

federal

(1926).

responsibility

aided the plaintiff

other

Sutton v. Otis, 68 Utah 85,
In

court

to

one

for the elevator

in establishing

a separate

Sutton,

the

action,
determine

liability

the

two

their

of

the

mishap
of the

defendants
respective

liability for damages arising out of the same set of facts.

In

the State action, the trial court refused to allow one defendant
to exercise a peremptory challenge because the other defendant
refused to join in making the challenge.

The Utah Supreme Court

held that it was prejudicial error to require the defendants to
exercise their peremptory challenges together when their interest
were clearly adverse and hostile.

Id.

After the Utah Supreme Court ! s decision in Sutton v. Otis,
14

supra, the Court did not have an opportunity to address the issue
again until Randle v. Allen, 223 Utah Adv. Rep. 6, 862 P.2d 1329
(Utah 1993).

In Randle, the Plaintiff Steven Randle filed suit

for the wrongful death of his wife, Rosan Randle, against the
driver of the other vehicle, Carl Allen and Salt Lake County and
the

Utah

Department

of

Transportation.

The

facts

at

trial

revealed that the Randle vehicle collided with the truck driven
by Allen in an intersection.

Mr. Randle sued claiming Allen was

negligent in the operation of his vehicle and that UDOT and Salt
Lake County were negligent in the design and maintenance of the
intersection where the accident occurred.

The Defendant Allen

counterclaimed for medical expenses, lost wages and damage to his
truck.

The jury returned

a verdict

finding Mrs. Randle 80%

negligent.
On appeal, Allen argued that each of the three Defendants
had separate counsel, had filed separate answers and therefore,
their interest were adverse.
.
establish

Id.

that these
the

of

adverse

interests

for

Indeed, Sutton stated that extra

challenges

parties only

factors by themselves do not

existence

purposes of the Rule.
peremptory

In response, the Court held,

should be granted

if there is
respecting

"a substantial

between

them

the

suit."

68 Utah at 141, 249 P. at 457.

to multiple
controversy

subject-matter

of

the

Otherwise,

parties on the same side of a lawsuit should join in
exercising the allowed challenges.
15

Id.

Sutton held

that a "substantial controversy" did not exist simply
because co-parties were uncooperative and attempted to
shift liability to the other.

_Id. at 144, 249 P. at

458.
The

Court

reaffirmed

its holding

in

Sutton

that

extra

peremptory challenges should be allowed only when a "substantial
controversy" exists between the co-parties.
delegated

to the

appraising

the

determining]
that

trial

degree

whether

side more

^d.

The Court then

judge the responsibility
"of

that

challenges

adverseness
adverseness

among

of

carefully

co-parties

truly warrants

than the other."

_Id.

and

giving

The

Court

continued:
In our view, a "substantial controversy" exists
when a party on one side of a lawsuit has a cross-claim
against a co-party that constitutes, in effect, a
separate, distinct lawsuit from the action existing
between the Plaintiffs and Defendants.

When, however,

a cross-claim is merely a derivative of the original
action, such as a cross-claim for indemnification or
contribution, a "substantial controversy" does not
exist for the purposes of Rule 47.
Id.
The Utah

Supreme

Court held

that Allen's

interest

were

adverse to those of the UDOT and County because of his claim for
damages

based

intersection.

upon

negligent

design

and maintenance

The Court found that no substantial
16

of

the

controversy

existed between the County and UDOT in that both of them asserted
that Randle or Allen were responsible for the accident.

The

Court found that they had common interests in defending the
condition and design of the intersection.

Accordingly, the Court

held that allowing UDOT and the County to exercise separate
peremptory challenges, was error.
C.

Applicable Standard of Review.

The Plaintiff argues that the issue relating to Rule 47 of
the Utah

Rules

of

Civil

Procedure

is one

involving

the

interpretation of a Statute and therefore is reviewed by this
Court for correctness.

State v. Larsen, 865 P. 2d 1355, 1357

(Utah 1993); Ward v. Richfield City, 793 P.2d 757, 759 (Utah
1990) (Appellant's Brief at 1).
It is respectfully submitted that the interpretation of Rule
47 is not at issue in this case.

Rule 47 and the interpreting

case law make it clear that if a "substantial controversy"
exists between co-defendants, each are entitled to separate
peremptory challenges.

The issue in this case is therefore the

application of the facts to the stated principles of law.

To

that end, the Supreme Court in Randle, supra, held that it was
the trial court's responsibility to:
Carefully appraise the degree of adverseness
among co-parties and determine whether that
adverseness truly warrants giving that side more
challenges than the other.
Id.
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As noted by the Court in State v. Gordon,, 253 Utah Adv. Rep.
55 (Utah Ct. App. 1994),
Trial courts are generally accorded some
degree of discretion in applying a legal standard
to a given set of facts.
932, 937 (Utah 1994).

State v. Pena, 869 P.2d

Such "discretion" allows the

trial court "to reach one of several possible
conclusions about the legal affect of a particular
set of facts without risking reversal."

Id..

The

Pena court likened the degree of discretion accorded
a trial court to a "pasture," the boundaries of
which are determined by "fences" erected by
appellate courts.

Id.

Accordingly, the standard to be applied in this case is one
of "abuse of discretion."
As

demonstrated

below, Judge Harding

determined

that the

facts of the case warranted a finding that the three Defendants
were

disparate

peremptory

enough

challenges.

to

warrant

A party

the

award

challenging

of

a trial

separate
court's

finding has the heavy burden of establishing that those findings
are not supported by substantial and competent evidence.

Utah

Appellate Courts have clearly held that to meet the burden, an
appellant
finding

must

and

marshall

then

all

demonstrate

of

the

that

evidence
the

supporting

evidence

is

the

legally

insufficient to support the finding even in viewing them in the
light most favorable to the trial court.
18

Consolidation Coal v.

Utah Div. of State Lands, 253 Utah Adv. Rep. 6 (Utah

1994);

Procon Corp. v. Utah Dept. of Transportation, 876 P.2d 890 (Utah
Ct. App. 1994); Robb v. Anderton, 863 P.2d 1322 (Utah 1993).
In this

case, the Appellant

has not met

the burden of

marshaling the evidence as it relates to the peremptory challenge
issue and accordingly, the court should refuse to address this
issue in its entirety.

Fitzgereld v. Critchfield, 744 P.2d 301

(Utah Ct. App. 1987).

This Court has shown no reluctance in

affirming when the appellant
evidence.

fails to adequately marshall

the

West Valley City v. Majestic Investment Co., 171 Utah

Adv. Rep. 49 (Utah Ct. App. 1991); Grahn v. Gregory, 800 P.2d 320
(Utah App. 1990); Turnbaugh v. Anderson, 793 P.2d 939 (Utah App.
1990).

If the Court proceeds to address the issue for any

reason, it should be based upon an abuse of discretion standard.
D.

The Facts of this Case Support the Award of
Peremptory Challenges to Each of the Defendants.
1.

Substantial Controversy as it Relates to
Pleasant Grove City.

The Plaintiff has conceded that the position of Pleasant
Grove

City

warrant

is

sufficiently

an award of

adverse

separate

to the

peremptory

other

parties

challenges.

to

In the

hearing conducted on Thursday, July 15, 1993, prior to trial, the
following interchange took place between the court and Mr. Lynn
Harris, attorney for the Plaintiff:
The Court:

We're meeting in chambers.

An the

court has indicated on Plaintiff's motion to strike,
plus the supplemental designation of witnesses, that
19

that motion is denied.
The next was a motion to limit Defendants'
number of preemptory challenges, or in the
alternative increase the number of preemptories
permitted by the Plaintiff.

I'm going to deny that

motion, buy indicate to counsel that I am going
to have one alternate juror.

And if you all

want four preemptories I'll give you all four,
but otherwise, only upon mutual agreement.
What do you want to do?

Do you want four for

a preemptory?
Mr. Harris:

Three plus one?

I think so.

Your Honor, would it be appropriate -- I
don't know if you looked at that case we quoted
about how there's got to be a disparate interest
situation in there -- and I clearly will not
dispute Pleasant Grove City has disparate
interests, but I'm a little interested in how
Smith and Stone have disparate interests.

And

Mr. Jeffs' response was just they -- no response.
Somewhere along the lines if there's going to be
grounds for having equal preemptories each, I at
least ought to have the opportunity of knowing
exactly what it is that makes them so disparate
in their claims when Mr. Moody gets to have three
and Mr. Jeffs gets to have three, when in many
20

respects it is close to that case.

It just seems

to me, for the record, so I can understand that, we
need to argue that or deal with it so we can advance
our argument now.
The Court:

Counsel, I feel that they are

disparate enough, just by the nature of the case,
to permit it.

I don't think we need that.

(Emphasis added).
Tr. 7/15/93 hearing, Addendum, Exhibit 1.
The Plaintiff's concession that the Defendant Pleasant Grove
City has clearly disparate interests is clearly supported by the
evidence in this case.
City's

responsibility

Amended Complaint.

The Plaintiff addressed Pleasant Grove
in the

Second

Cause

of Action

of

her

The Plaintiff alleged that the agents and

employees of the City failed to timely report the removal of the
stop sign at the intersection where the accident occurred and
replace the same; and, further failed to configure the signs at
the intersection in a safe manner (R. 38-45).

The theory of

negligence employed by the Plaintiff is entirely different than
the theory relied upon against the Defendants William Roger Smith
and Stone Carpets.

In addition to the difference in the theory

relied upon, the range of proof was entirely different.
for Pleasant

Grove

City had to prepare

Counsel

for and evaluate the

witnesses that would be called on the issues of the existence of
the stop sign, its removal, the duty to detect the absence of
the sign and the effect of the absence on the accident scenario.
21

All of the above remove the issues relating to Pleasant Grove
City from those faced by the other Defendants.

Although Pleasant

Grove

it contended

City

did

not

file

a cross-claim,

by

affirmative defense that the accident and any injuries or damage
resulting therefrom, were the result of the conduct of the
Plaintiff or other third-parties (R. 49-52).
While it is true that the Court in Randle, supra, noted the
existence of an independent lawsuit between Allen and the two
governmental

defendants, the Court relied

upon the basic

difference in theory of recovery to justify the award of separate
preemptory challenges.

In this case, the position of Pleasant

Grove City is clearly separate and distinct than that of the
other Defendants.
different

The allegations by the Plaintiff were

as to the

City

and

the proof

relating

to the

establishment of a defected intersection was exclusively a matter
that counsel for the City had to deal with.

The scrutiny of a

jury panel based upon the facts exclusively tied to Pleasant
Grove's responsibility justified the award of separate preemptory
challenges.

In sum, Pleasant Grove was attempting to show that

the Plaintiff was negligent, which would align it with Defendant
Smith.

Pleasant Grove was attempting to establish that the

Defendant Smith was liable, aligning it with the Plaintiff.
Finally, Pleasant Grove was solely responsible to establish that
the intersection was not dangerous or defective which would align
it with none of the Defendants.
One additional note should be made as it relates to Pleasant
22

Grove City.

Common defendants in a lawsuit, although clearly

diverse, may forego "finger pointing" at other defendants if the
plaintiff is having difficulty during the course of the trial in
establishing his or her case.

The appellant points to the

witnesses that were called and other trial tactics to evidence a
lack of "substantial controversy."
unfair.

That analogy is totally

Whether or not Pleasant Grove or the other Defendants

could afford to forego attacking other Defendants is a function
of how the trial and evidence proceed.

The ascertainment of

whether a substantial controversy exists must be made from the
facts existing before trial uninfluenced by trial tactics.
2.

Substantial Controversy as it Relates to
Stone Carpets.

A casual examination of the facts in this case would reveal
that the Defendant Smith was the driver of the vehicle involved
in the accident and that the Defendant, Stone Carpets, as his
employer, could only be liable if Smith was determined to be
negligent.

However, as developed in the Statement of Facts,

although both Stone Carpets and Smith had a common interest in
establishing

the Plaintiff

and Defendant Pleasant Grove's

negligence and Smith's lack thereof, there was a substantial
controversy between Smith and Stone Carpets warranting separate
counsel and the right to separate preemptory challenges.
As outlined in the Statement of Facts, the Defendant Smith
and Stone Carpets were originally represented by the same
counsel, M. Dale Jeffs.

However, at the time that the Defendant

Smith's deposition was taken, Mr. Smith alleged that Joe Stone of
23

Stone

Carpets

investigators
accident.

met

with

concerning

him

and

some of

told

the

him

factual

to

lie

to

the

aspects of

the

Specifically, Joe Stone told the Defendant Smith to

fabricate

a story

that

his van

stalled

intersection at the time of the accident.

while

entering

the

That scenario would

act to decrease the speed of the Smith vehicle and increase the
time the Plaintiff would allegedly have to view Smith and react.
The

record

reveals

conversation
parties

had

that

Joe

Stone

with

William

Roger

truly

adverse

interest

denied

Smith.

having

any

Obviously,

in the case.

the

such
two

Since both

parties were accusing the other of lying about what happened, it
would be impossible for the Defendant Stone Carpets and Roger
Smith to have their interests protected by the same preemptory
challenges.
In addition to the obvious controversy between Stone Carpets
and Smith, the disagreement poured over into evidentiary areas.
At

the

time of

trial, the Defendant

Smith had given

several

statements to investigators and testified at deposition.

Because

Smith and Stone Carpets were represented

by separate counsel,

each had to prepare for the varying stories at trial.
testimony
expert

could

greatly

impact the

reconstructionist

testified.

Smith's

foundation upon which

the

Stone Carpets had to be

prepared to impeach Smith and Smith had to prepare the delicate
issues surrounding his conversation with Joe Stone.
Stone had

to prepare

controversy.

for the Plaintiff's

Smith and

exploitation of the

The Plaintiff was attempting to use the controversy
24

as a basis to introduce insurance into the case which was highly
resisted by the Defendant, Stone Carpets.

The Defendant Smith's

testimony greatly affected that issue which separated to a
greater degree the interest of the Defendant Stone Carpets and
William Roger Smith.
Although the issue of liability is similar between Stone and
Smith, the extreme conflict that developed regarding essential
elements of the accident scenario justified the determination
that their trial tactics could differ and certainly that their
standing vis a vie the Plaintiff was different justifying the
award of preemptory challenges.

It must be kept in mind that the

Court in Randle, supra, and Otis, supra, was only faced with
issues regarding divergence on legal issues such as negligence
and

causation.

controversy,"

Certainly,

within

the term

there must be a consideration of

"substantial
"degree of

adverseness" that contemplates facts similar to those presented
in an analysis of the position of Stone Carpets and William Roger
Smith.

After all, the adversity between Smith and Stone Carpets

was greater than that normally existing between plaintiffs and
defendants.
E.

Any Error of the Trial Court was not Prejudicial Error.

In Randle, the appellant

contended

that the improper

allowance of preemptory challenges allowed the defendants to
manipulate the jury selection and seat a jury consisting solely
of men.

_Id.

The Utah Supreme Court excused the plaintiff from

demonstrating prejudice, the Court did so based upon the size of
25

the disparity.

Id..

In this case, the Plaintiff has not developed for purposes
of this appeal any theory that would support the argument that
the final outcome was manipulated or controlled by the award of
preemptory

challenges.

Additionally, the size of the claimed

disparity is significantly reduced by the Plaintiff's concession
that Pleasant Grove City had disparate interests justifying the
award of separate preemptory challenges.
Inasmuch as the Appellant has failed to argue any theory
upon which this Court could conclude that the jury panel was
manipulated to a certain end and inasmuch as the disparity is
significantly

reduced

by

the Plaintiff's

concession

regarding

Pleasant Grove City, any error by the trial court could not be
viewed as prejudicial.
POINT II: THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERROR IN REFUSING TO
GIVE THE RIGHT-OF-WAY INSTRUCTION OFFERED BY THE
PLAINTIFF.
The

Plaintiff

embodiment

of

her

submitted
theory

proposed

regarding

instruction

the

19

as

the

right-of-way

of

the

intersection where the accident occurred:
You are instructed that Utah Code Annotated
41-6-72(2) provides:

when more than one vehicle

enters or approaches an intersection from different
highways at approximately the same time at the
intersection:
(a) is not regulated by an official traffic
control device;
26

(b) is not regulated because the traffic
control device is inoperative; or
(c) is regulated from all directions by stop
signs,
the operator of the vehicle on the left shall yield the
right-of-way to the vehicle on the right unless otherwise directed by a police officer.
If you find, after preponderance of the evidence,
that William Roger Smith was operating a motor vehicle
in violation of the foregoing statute, such conduct
creates a presumption of negligence.
R. 19, Addendum, Exhibit 2.
The

Defendant

Pro-Tech

Restoration

d/b/a

Stone

Carpets

contended that Utah Code Annotated 41-6-72(2) (1953 as Amended)
presented only the Plaintiff's theory of the case.
by

the

testimony

of

Restoration

claimed

intersection

at

Dr.
that

Blotter,
the

"approximately

the

vehicles
the

same

As evidenced

Defendant
did

not

Pro-Tech
enter

time," and

the

therefore

Subsection 1 of Utah Code Annotated 41-6-72 was the appropriate
Section.

Accordingly, Pro-Tech submitted proposed

instruction

number 55 which provides:
You are instructed that the Utah Code Annotated
41-6-72(1) provides:
(1)

The operator

intersection
control

not

device

of

regulated

shall yield
27

a vehicle
by

an

approaching

official

the right-of-way

an

traffic
to any

vehicle that has entered the intersection

from a

different highway.
You are instructed that the Utah Code Annotated
41-6-72(2) provides:
(2)

When more

than one vehicle

enters or

approaches an intersection from different
highways at approximately the same time and the
intersection:
(a) is not regulated by an official traffic
control device;
(b) is not regulated because the traffic
control device is inoperative; or
(c) is regulated from all directions by stop
signs,
the operator of the vehicle on the left shall
yield the right-of-way to the vehicle on the right
unless otherwise directed by a police officer.
R. 558, Addendum, Exhibit 2.
The Defendant Pro-Tech offered proposed instruction number
36 which provides:
When two vehicles are approaching an intersection
at approximately the same time and distance from it,
the driver approaching on the right has the right-ofway, and it is the duty of the driver approaching on
the left to yield the right-of-way.
A driver entering an intersection first has the
28

right-of-way.

However, a driver may not speed up to

enter an intersection first, nor may a driver take the
right-of-way
ahead

of

by

entering

another

approaching

the

driver.

intersection

In order

for

from the left to take the

slightly
a

driver

right-of-way,

that driver must enter the intersection clearly ahead
of the driver approaching from the right.
R. 646, Addendum, Exhibit 2.
The court, after receiving the proposed instructions from
the parties including an instruction from Defendant Stone Carpets
that cited only Subsection 1 of UCA 41-6-72 (1953 as Amended) (R.
702,

Addendum,

Exhibit

2 ) , gave

the

following

instruction

regarding right-of-way:
When two vehicles are approaching an intersection
at approximately the same time and distance from it,
the driver

approaching

on the right has the right-

of-way, and it is the duty of the driver approaching on
the left to yield the right-of-way.
A driver entering an intersection first has the
right-of-way.

However, a driver may not speed up to

enter an intersection first, nor may a driver take the
right-of-way
ahead

of

by

another

approaching

entering
driver.

the
In

intersection
order

from the left to take the

for

slightly
a

driver

right-of-way,

that driver must enter the intersection clearly ahead
of the driver approaching from the right.
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The Utah Supreme Court has long recognized that it is "the
duty of the court to cover the theories of both parties in his
instructions."

Startin v. Madsen, 237 P.2d 834 (1951).

Supreme

has

Court

reenforced

this

concept

more

The Utah

recently

in

stating:
It is well recognized that the parties are
entitled to have their theories of the case
presented to the jury in the form of instructions,
but only if they are supported by the evidence.
Powers v. Gene's Building Materials, Inc., 567 P.2d

174, 176

(1977).
There is no question that the Plaintiff's theory of the case
was included in the court's instruction number 31.

The trial

court simply deleted the subparagraphs over which there was no
dispute in this case.

As edited by the court, if two vehicles

approach an unregulated intersection at approximately the same
time, the operator of the vehicle on the left must yield to the
operator on the right.
caused

by

deleting

There was absolutely no harm or prejudice

the

subparagraphs

of

Plaintiff's

proposed

instruction number 19.
The second paragraph of the trial court's instruction number
31

deals

with

the

circumstance

when

one

driver

intersection clearly ahead of another driver.
that

is

internally

inconsistent

with

the

enters

the

There is nothing
instruction.

In

essence, the trial court gave and edited version of Utah Code
Annotated 41-6-72(1) and (2) (1990 as Amended).
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The Statute is

not

ambiguous

instruction.

or

contradictory

and

neither

is

the

court's

While it is true that the Plaintiff has a right to

have the jury instructed in her theory of the case, so does the
Defendant.

The court, in a less confusing manner than presented

by separate instructions, gave the jury the alternate theories in
one instruction.

The jury received instruction as to the right-

of-way if they found that the vehicles entered the intersection
at

the

same

time

and

also

received

instruction

of

the

law

regarding right-of-way if they found that one vehicle was in fact
in the intersection clearly ahead of the other.
Dr. Blotter testified that three seconds before the point of
impact the Dodge van driven by Mr. Smith was only thirty feet
from the point of impact or at the approach of the intersection.
The

Toyota van, driven by the Plaintiff would have been one

hundred and twenty-six feet back from the point of impact, three
seconds before the accident (T., Vol. 10 at 2301-2310).
The Appellate court reviews challenges to jury instructions
under a "correctness" standard.

Steffensen v. Smith's Management

Corporation, 172 Utah Adv. Rep. 36 (Utah Ct. App. 1991); Knapstad
v.

Smith's Management

1989).

Inasmuch

as

Corporation, 774 P.2d
the

instruction

1, 2

clearly

(Utah App.

mirrors

and

accurately embodies the substance of the Statute and presents the
parties' various theories regarding the principle of right-ofway, it was appropriate and proper.
It should be noted that although the Defendant argues that
the

instruction

did not present
31

the Plaintiff's

theory

in a

"clear and understandable way," the appellant provides absolutely
no

analysis

to

support

that

conclusion.

Contrary

to

the

assertion of the Plaintiff, the instruction fairly and adequately
dealt with the two possible factual situations affecting rightof-way.
POINT III:
A.

THE COURT DID NOT ERROR IN ALLOWING
NEWELL KNIGHT TO TESTIFY.

The Appellant did not Object to the Manner in Which
Witness Newell Knight was Called.

The Plaintiff first contends with regard to Newell Knight's
testimony that:
Over Ms. Carrier's objections, however, the
court allowed Mr. Knight to take the stand and
testify (T., Vol. 10 at 2439).
Appellant's brief at 28.
The Record cited by the Appellant simply does not support
her position.

The Transcript reads as follows:
The Court:

You may call your next witness.

Mr. Harris:

It was my intention at this time,

the last is to simply read about -- I hate to do it
again, but read a bunch of pages from Newell Knight's
deposition, which

I took on the 27th day of April,

1993.
And I would just ask that —

I'll read both parts and

do it quickly and be finished.
The Court:

Any objection?

Mr. Jeffs:

Not to the generalization he wants to
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read some parts.

And as far as Mr. Knight's background

is concerned, I informed the court earlier we would
not agree to a reading of the deposition, and we had
objections to foundation and his testimony.
The Court:

Very well.

We'll need to have Mr.

Knight called as a witness.
Mr. Harris:

Your Honor --

Mr. Chipman:
Mr. Harris:

He's out in the hall.
May I approach the bench before

we do that?
The Court:

You may.

(Bench conference held)
The Court:

[whereupon Newell Knight was called

to the stand]
T., Vol. 10 at 2438-2439.
At the time of the jury instruction conference, Mr. Chipman,
attorney for Pleasant Grove indicated that he was not certain
that he would

call Mr. Knight as a witness.

At that time,

counsel for the Plaintiff informed the court that if Mr. Chipman
did not call Mr. Knight, he was prepared and intended to read
certain parts of Mr. Knight's deposition.

Over the objection of

the Defendants, the court ruled that since Newell Knight had been
designated by a witness by Mr. Chipman and had been allowed to be
deposed, the Plaintiff could call Mr. Knight as a witness.

At

that time, counsel for Stone Carpets indicated that he objected
to the foundation for Mr. Knight's opinions and the court ruled
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that Mr, Knight would have to be present if his deposition was to
be read so that he could be subjected to cross-examination.
As clearly indicated above, counsel for the Plaintiff did
not object to the ruling of the trial court with regard to the
manner in which Newell Knight was called and is prohibited with
raising the issue on appeal.
P.2d

Skyline Leasing v. Datacap, 535

512 (Utah 1976); Barson v. E.R. Squibb & Sons, lnc.r

682

P.2d 832 (Utah 1984); Buehner Block Co. v. UWC Associates, 752
P.2d 892 (Utah 1988).
B.

The Cross-Examination of Newell Knight was done in
Accordance with the Rules of Civil Procedure.

After

calling

Newell

Knight

to

the

stand,

Plaintiff's

counsel read the desired portions of Newell Knight's deposition
(T., Vol. 10 at 2440-2472).

Newell Knight was asked from his

deposition, questions relating to the speed of the vehicles (T.,
Vol.

10

at

2454-2458);

the

underlining

data

supporting

the

computations of speed (T., Vol. 10 at 2449-2461); the evidence of
braking

prior

to

impact

(T., Vol.

10

at

2462-2463);

and,

perception in reaction time (T., Vol. 10 at 2467-2471).
On

cross-examination,

cross-examined

counsel

for

Pro-Tech

Restoration

Mr. Knight regarding

the

fact that he did not

conduct an accident reconstruction of the accident himself and
was merely using the computations utilized by Dr. Limpert to come
to his conclusions (T., Vol. 10 at 2472-2477).
As argued in Appellant's brief, Newell Knight was then asked
whether he had an opinion as to who had the right-of-way at the
intersection at the time of the accident.
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Mr. Knight indicated

that he did and testified that Mr. Smith had the right-of-way, in
his opinion (T., Vol. 10 at 2477-2478).
On re-direct, counsel for the Plaintiff interrogated Newell
Knight

extensively

regarding

right-of-way

and Newell

Knight's

opinion with regard thereto (T., Vol. 10 at 2479-2484, 2485-2493,
2496-2497).
Contrary to the assertion contained in Appellant's brief,
Newell Knight was not asked any questions with regard to the
interpretation of Utah Code Annotated 41-6-72 (1990 as Amended)
on cross-examination (Appellant's brief at 28).

Instead, it was

during the extensive re-direct examination by Plaintiff in which
Mr.

Harris,

attorney

for

the

Plaintiff,

launched

discussion of the Statute and its interpretation.

into

a

It was Mr.

Harris who involved Newell Knight in the interpretation of the
Statute regarding right-of-way.
Plaintiff claims that the questions posed to Mr. Knight by
the Defendants regarding right-of-way constituted
cross-examination.

impermissible

It is well established that the trial court

has broad discretion with regard to its rulings relating to the
scope of cross-examination.

As noted by Judge Harding the court

had allowed broad and extensive cross-examination by counsel of
all witnesses:
The Court:

The court has during the course of the

trial granted examination outside the scope of either
cross or direct, as the case may have been, simply in
their interests of time.
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The witness was available,

could

have

formality
appropriate

been

of

recalled

limiting

by

them

either

in

in those general

party.

scope

The

didn't

circumstances.

seem

1 have

done that in cases where the court has felt that it was
appropriate for other reasons.
this case.

I didn't see that in

And as to that specific issue, Mr. Knight

had been called as an expert, dually qualified, and I
think testified within the scope of that expertise.
And he can be argued with, you can either accept or
reject, as may the jury.

When we get ot the point of

instruction in the law they, if course, are going to be
told

that what

I tell

them

they're not to ignore it.

the

law

is, it is and

And that will be the law in

the case, if they're awake to hear it.
T., Vol. 10 at 2525-2526.
As noted by the Utah Supreme Court in Whitehead v. American
Motors Sales Corp., 801 P.2d 920 (Utah 1990), "the proper scope
of cross-examination is within the sound discretion of the trial
court and should not be disturbed absent a showing of abuse.
After having been extensively questioned regarding the speed
of the vehicles at the time of impact and before, there was not a
large

jump

to

ask

Mr.

Knight,

in essence, who

entered

intersection first and therefore had the right-of-way.

the

It is

totally unrealistic for Plaintiff's counsel to believe that he
could

extract

all

the

information

regarding

the

accident

including damage to the vehicles, movement of the vehicles during
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the accident scenario and their respective speeds and expect that
defense counsel would be precluded from having the witness use
those speed calculations to testify where the vehicles were in
relation to each other as they approached the intersection.

As

carefully documented above, it was counsel for the Plaintiff that
involved Mr. Knight in a discussion regarding the right-of-way
Statute and its interpretation.

Defense counsel simply asked the

question regarding Newell Knight's opinion of right-of-way based
upon his calculations of speed and the position of vehicles (T.,
Vol. 10 at 2477-2478).
C.

Newell Knight Testified Properly and within the Bounds
Established for an Expert.

Plaintiff

argues that Mr. Knight was allowed to testify

improperly on questions of law (Appellant's brief at 29-30).

As

established above, defense counsel asked Mr. Knight a question
regarding

his

opinion

of

right-of-way.

It was

Plaintiff's

counsel who interrogated Mr. Knight regarding the interpretation
of the right-of-way Statute.
As noted by the Court in Davidson v. Prince, 813 P.2d 1225
(Utah
trial,

1991),
we

"in reviewing

give

deference

the
to

admissibility

the trial

of

court's

evidence

at

advantageous

position and do not overturn the result unless it is clear the
trial court errored."

The Court continued by citing Rule 704 of

the Utah Rules of Evidence and stated that "testimony in the form
of opinion or inference otherwise admissible is not objectionable
because it embraces an ultimate issue to be decided by the trier
of fact."
37

The

Record

questions

is clear

regarding

that

Mr. Knight

was

not

asked

"negligence" but only questions

any

regarding

right-of-way based upon the position of the cars as they entered
the intersection.
In reviewing questions regarding the admissibility of expert
testimony,

this

Court

reviews the issues under

"clear error" standard.

a deferential

See Steffensen v. Smith's Management

Corporation, 172 Utah Adv. Rep. 36 (Utah App. 1991); Davidson v.
Prince, supra at 1230; State v. Kinsey, 797 P. 2d 424, 427 (Utah
App.

1990).

Further,

an

appellant

bares

the

burden

of

demonstrating that the excluded evidence could have influenced
the jury to render a different verdict.

Anton v. Thomas, 806

P.2d 744, 746 (Utah App. 1991).
In Davidson,
properly
negligent.

supra the Court held

excluded

an

expert

opinion

that

that

the

the

trial

court

defendant

was

In doing so, the Court stated that "questions which

allow a witness to simply tell a jury what result to reach are
not permitted."

_Id. at 1231.

The Court noted however that a

witness may testify as to the parties' actions, including whether
a party acted with care. Id..

In this case Newell Knight was

asked only his opinion regarding right-of-way and was not asked
questions

regarding

negligence

or percentage

apportionment

of

fault.
The testimony elicited from Newell Knight was permissible
and within the bounds established by this Court.
CONCLUSION
38

The facts of this case clearly establish that Pleasant Grove
City

had

interests

Defendants.
by

the

separated

acknowledgment

to separate preemptory

question

from

that

a

substantial

accusations

of witness

that

the

other

Pleasant

challenges.
controversy

Defendants Smith and Stone Carpets.
serious

it

two

The Defendants' position in that regard is bolstered

Plaintiff's

entitled

that

Grove

was

There can be no
existed

between

The Record is replete with

tampering

that would make

impossible for the two Defendants to cooperate.

it

The differences

between the two Defendants influenced legal issues and factual
issues surrounding
There

was

determined

the manner in which the accident occurred.

substantial

evidence

upon

which

the

trial

that each of the Defendants was entitled

separate preemptory challenges.

court

to their

Absent an abuse of discretion,

this Court should not overturn the Ruling of the trial court.
There is no basis in the Record to establish that the trial
court errored in submitting the instruction regarding right-ofway.

In

accordance

with

the

proposed

instructions

by

the

parties, the court gave the statutory instruction embodying the
theories advanced by both the Plaintiff and the Defendants.

The

instruction properly characterized the Statute and was not, in
any regard, misleading or confusing.
Finally, the court's Rulings with regard to the testimony of
Newell Knight were appropriate and in accordance with the Rules
of Evidence.

Defense counsel did not impermissibly exceed the

scope of direct-examination and the testimony regarding right-of39

way was not an ultimate issue of fact proscribed by Appellate
court rulings.
Accordingly, the Judgment on the Verdict rendered in this
case should be maintained and the appeal of the Plaintiff denied.

DATED this ff \ pJrday of February, 1995.

^k*- j

W\~J,

Robert L. Moody,\ EsqL
Attorney for Deffendaiit/Appellee
William Roger Smith
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ADDENDUM
E x h i b i t 1: T r a n s c r i p t of Hearing

7/15/93

1

1

THURSDAY, JULY 15, 1993

2

(IN CHAMBERS PRIOR TO TRIAL)

3

THE COURT:

WE'RE MEETING IN CHAMBERS. AND

4

THE COURT HAS INDICATED ON PLAINTIFF'S MOTION TO STRIKE,

5

PLUS THE SUPPLEMENTAL DESIGNATION OF WITNESSES, THAT THAT

6

MOTION IS DENIED.

7

THE NEXT WAS A MOTION TO LIMIT DEFENDANTS*

8

NUMBER OF PREEMPTORY CHALLENGES, OR IN THE ALTERNATIVE

9

INCREASE THE NUMBER OF PREEMPTORIES PERMITTED BY THE

10

PLAINTIFF.

11

TO COUNSEL THAT I AM GOING TO HAVE ONE ALTERNATE JUROR.

12

AND IF YOU ALL WANT FOUR PREEMPTORIES I'LL GIVE YOU ALL

13

FOUR, BUT OTHERWISE, ONLY UPON MUTUAL AGREEMENT.

14
15

I'M GOING TO DENY THAT MOTION, BUT INDICATE

WHAT DO YOU WANT TO DO?

DO YOU WANT FOUR FOR

A PREEMPTORY?

16

MR. HARRIS:

THREE PLUS ONE?

I THINK SO.

17

YOUR HONOR, WOULD IT BE APPROPRIATE — I

18

DON'T KNOW IF YOU LOOKED AT THAT CASE WE QUOTED ABOUT HOW

19

THERE'S GOT TO BE A DISPARATE INTEREST SITUATION IN

20

THERE —

21

CITY HAS DISPARATE INTERESTS, BUT I'M A LITTLE INTERESTED

22

IN HOW SMITH AND STONE HAVE DISPARATE INTERESTS.

23

JEFFS' RESPONSE WAS JUST THEY —

24

ALONG THE LINES IF THERE'S GOING TO BE GROUNDS FOR HAVING

25

EQUAL PREEMPTORIES EACH, I AT LEAST OUGHT TO HAVE THE

AND I CLEARLY WILL NOT DISPUTE PLEASANT GROVE

NO RESPONSE.

AND MR.

SOMEWHERE

7

1

OPPORTUNITY OF KNOWING EXACTLY WHAT IT IS THAT MAKES THEM

2

SO DISPARATE IN THEIR CLAIMS WHEN MR. MOODY GETS TO HAVE

3

THREE AND MR. JEFFS GETS TO HAVE THREE, WHEN IN MANY

4

RESPECTS IT IS CLOSE TO THAT CASE.

5

FOR THE RECORD, SO I CAN UNDERSTAND THAT, WE NEED TO

6

ARGUE THAT OR DEAL WITH IT SO WE CAN ADVANCE OUR ARGUMENT

7

NOW.

8
9
10

THE COURT:

IT JUST SEEMS TO ME,

COUNSEL, I FEEL THAT THEY ARE

DISPARATE ENOUGH, JUST BY THE NATURE OF THE CASE, TO
PERMIT IT.

11

I DON'T THINK WE NEED THAT.
THE MOTION OF PLEASANT GROVE CITY TO PROHIBIT

12

ANY MENTION OF INSURANCE IS GRANTED, AND THE PARTIES

13

SHOULD BE CAUTIONED NOT TO TALK ABOUT INSURANCE AS AN

14

ISSUE.

15

(FURTHER MOTIONS DEALT WITH)

16
17
18
19
20
21

I, CREED H. BARKER, CSR, DO HEREBY CERTIFY THE FOREGOING
PAGE TO BE A TRUE AND ACCURATE TRANSCRIPTION OF SAID
PROCEEDING, TAKEN DOWN IN SHORTHAND UPON SAID DATE, AND
REDUCED TO WRITING THIS 22ND DAY OF DECEMBER, 1993.

22
23
S^

CREE^ H .^J^KER, CSR

A D D E N D U M
Exhibit 2: Proposed Instructions Relating
to Right-of-Way

INSTRUCTION NO.

1 ?

You are instructed that Utah Code Annotated § 41-6-72(2)
provides: when more than one vehicle enters or approaches an
intersection from different highways at approximately the same time at
the intersection:
(a) is not regulated by an official traffic control device;
(b) is not regulated because the traffic control device is
inoperative; or
(c) is regulated from all directions by stop signs,
the operator of the vehicle on the left shall yield the right-of-way
to the vehicle on the right unless otherwise directed by a police officer.

If you find, after a preponderance of the evidence, that William
Roger Smith was operating a motor vehicle in violation of the foregoing
statute, such conduct creates a presumption of negligence.

INSTRUCTION NO.

JP

When two vehicles are approaching an intersection at
the same time and a^^^rcfrst^antia 1Iy t ho^jg^»e- distance from it,
the driver approaching on the right has the right-of-way, and it
is the duty of the driver approaching on the left to yield the
right-of-wayA driver entering an intersection first has the rightof-way.

However,

a

driver

may

not

speed

up

to

enter an

intersection first, nor may a driver take the right-of-way by
entering the intersection slightly ahead of another driver.

In

order for a driver approaching from the left to take the rightof-way, that driver must enter the intersection clearly ahead of
the driver approaching from the right.

muji 5.10

G

INSTRUCTION NO. 31
When two vehicles are approaching an intersection at approximately the same time and
distance from it, the driver approaching on the right has the right-of-way, and it is the duty
of the driver approaching on the left to yield the right-of-way.
A driver entering an intersection first has the right-of-way. However, a driver may not
speed up to enter an intersection first, nor may a driver take the right-of-way by entering the
intersection slightly ahead of another driver. In order for a driver approaching from the left
to take theright-of-way,that driver must enter the intersection clearly ahead of the driver
approaching from the right.

INSTRUCTION NO.

jO

You are instructed that the Utah Code § 41-6-72(1) provides:
(1) The operator of a vehicle approaching an intersection
not regulated by an official traffic-control device shall yield
the right-of-way to any vehicle that has entered the
intersection from a different highway.

INSTRUCTION NO.

55*

You are instructed that the UTAH CODE ANN. § 41-6-72(1) provides:
(1)
The operator of a vehicle approaching an
intersection not regulated by an official trafficcontrol device shall yield the right-of-way to any
vehicle that has entered the intersection from a
different highway.
Your are instructed that the UTAH CODE ANN. § 41-6-72(2) provides:
(2)
When more than one vehicle enters or
approaches an intersection from different highways
at approximately the same time and the intersection:
(a) is not regulated by an official
traffic control device;
(b) is not regulated because the traffic
control device is inoperative; or
(c)
is regulated from all directions by
stop signs,
the operator of the vehicle on the left shall yield the right-of-way to the
vehicle on the right unless otherwise directed by a police officer.

References:
UTAH CODE ANN.
UTAH CODE ANN.

§ 41-6-72(1)
§ 41-6-72(2)
r* ~ o
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